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Abstract: We define a generic relational program analysis for an imperative,
stack-oriented byte code language with procedures, arrays and global variables
and instantiate it with an abstract domain of polyhedra. The analysis has
automatic inference of loop invariants and method pre-/post-conditions, and ef-
ficient checking of analysis results by a simple checker. Invariants, which can be
large, can be specialized for proving a safety policy using an automatic pruning
technique which reduces their size. The result of the analysis can be checked
efficiently by annotating the program with parts of the invariant together with
certificates of polyhedral inclusions, which allow to avoid certain complex poly-
hedral computation such as the convex hull of two polyhedra. Small, easily
checkable inclusion certificates are obtained using Farkas lemma for proving the
absence of solutions to systems of linear inequalities. The resulting checker is
sufficiently simple to be entirely certified within the Coq proof assistant.
Key-words: Static analysis, abstract interpretation, bytecode Java, Coq
∗ INRIA Rennes - Bretagne Atlantique/IRISA
† CNRS/IRISA
‡ Université Rennes I/IRISA
Certification de résultat pour l’analyse de
programme relationnelle
Résumé : Nous proposons une analyse générique de programme relationnelle
pour un langage de bytecode impératif avec pile d’opérande, procédures, ta-
bleaux et variables globales. Cette analyse est instanciée avec un domaine
abstrait de polyèdres. Elle propose une inférence automatique d’invariants de
boucle et de préconditions/postconditions de procédures, ainsi qu’une vérification
efficace du résultat de l’analyse par un vérificateur simple. Les invariants, qui
peuvent être grands, peuvent être spécialisés pour prouver une propriété de
sûreté en utilisant une technique automatique de compression de taille de cer-
tificat. Le résultat de l’analyse peut être vérifié efficacement en annotant le
programme avec une partie des invariants et quelques certificats d’inclusion
de polyèdre, qui permettent d’éviter certaines calculs polyédriques complexes
comme le calcul de l’enveloppe convexe de deux polyèdres. Nous obtenons des
certificats d’inclusion petits et facilement vérifiables grâce au lemme de Farkas
pour prouver l’absence de solution dans un système d’inégalités linéaires. Le
vérificateur ainsi obtenu est suffisamment simple pour être entièrement certifié
avec l’assistant à la preuve Coq.
Mots-clés : Analyse statique, interprétation abstraite, bytecode Java, Coq
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1 Introduction
Logic-based, static program verification, be it in form of abstract interpretation,
symbolic model checking or interactive proving of programs, is used in a number
of ways to improve the confidence in safety-critical systems and for protecting
host machines from malicious code, as e.g., done by the Java byte code verifier.
As applications and the program logics grow in complexity, an automated tech-
nique for verifying program invariants based on a program logics should ideally
meet all of the following three requirements:
  Automatic Inference: the complexity of both programs and the underlying
logic can quickly make it burdensome to conduct program proofs manu-
ally. Automatic inference of program properties is necessary to obtain a
technique that scales.
  Result certification: when inference is available, it often relies on advanced
deductive methods for inferring an invariant whose size and complexity
make it difficult to ascertain its validity manually. Efficient checking of
the result of the inference or of any proposed invariant in general becomes
important.
  Small Trusted Computing Base (TCB): the result checker becomes the
cornerstone of the reliability of the verification framework. In order to
reduce the part of the code base that needs to be trusted without proof,
the checker should be kept sufficiently simple and small in order to be able
to verify the checking algorithmics mechanically.
Program verification based on general Hoare-style program logics may follow
the Verification Condition Generator (VCGen) approach of e.g., Extended Static
Checking by Flanagan, Leino et al. [14] or use expressive type systems such
as the dependent type systems of Xi and Pfenning [27] for proving properties
of programs. The approaches based on VCGens are generally complete for
partial correctness and will produce a set of verification conditions which, when
satisfied, will allow to conclude that a given program property holds in the
logic. Verification conditions often fall into fragments of logic that require them
to be proved by dedicated decision procedures or theorem provers. VCGens
and the type-based approaches are primarily concerned with invariant checking
and discard part of the inference problem by relying on loop invariants and pre-
post-condition of methods to be provided by the programmer. In terms of small
TCB, the VCGens remain complex software which are hard to prove correct
in extenso. The machine-checked formalizations e.g., by Nipkow, Wildmoser
et al. [25, 26] show that this is indeed possible to certify an entire VCGen
inside a proof assistant but also that this remains a major software certification
challenge.
Another strand of program verification is based on abstract interpretation.
Abstract interpretation is an automatic technique for inferring program prop-
erties in the form of fixpoints of monotone data flow functions. As a theory
of proving programs it has strong semantic foundations. At the same time it
should be noted that the algorithmics of the domains underlying the more ad-
vanced analyses such as polyhedral analysis (initially described by Cousot and
Halbwachs [13]) is highly non-trivial. Checking an invariant is in theory sim-
ple as it only requires one more iteration to check that a property is indeed a
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fixpoint but, as said, this computation does in certain cases rely on non-trivial
algorithmics that forms part of what must be trusted. In previous work [9, 21],
some of the authors formalised the theory of abstract interpretation inside the
proof assistant Coq and extracted Caml implementations of a variety of pro-
gram analyses. This Certified Abstract Interpretation approach represents a
systematic way of reducing the TCB of static analyzers and fulfills the three
requirements listed above. However, a fully mechanised correctness proofs of
more advanced program analysers such as an optimised, polyhedral-based anal-
ysis would require an enormous effort in terms of program certification.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that by focusing on certifying
the result of the analysis rather than the analysis itself, it is possible to develop
a verification framework for advanced program properties that satisfies all of the
three desired properties and, at the same time, requires a significantly smaller
effort in order to be proved correct. This idea was previously used by Wildmoser
et al [24] who use the result of an untrusted interval analysis in a VCGen for
byte code and by Leroy [17] in his certification of a compiler back-end where
he, rather than certifying the complex graph-coloring algorithms for register
allocation, proves the correctness of a checker that verifies a given coloring re-
turned by an untrusted graph-coloring algorithms. Here, we generalise this idea
by developing a relational analysis framework together with a certified checker.
The basic observation is that an abstract interpretation can be decomposed into
an abstract domain of properties, a generic program logic for reasoning about
these properties and a fixpoint engine for solving recursive equations over the
abstract domains. The inference does not need to use certified abstract domain
operations and fixpoint engines, and the checking of invariants does not need
to use a fixpoint engine at all. We take advantage of this to design a checker
that re-uses the program logic but replaces the more complex domain operations
with simpler ones, at the expense of providing some extra information in the
certificate accompanying a program.
2 Overview
In the first part of this paper, we will develop a fully relational, interprocedural
analyser which automatically infers an invariant for each control point in the
program, a pre-condition that must hold at the point of calling a procedure
and a post-condition that is guaranteed to hold when the procedure returns.
Relational analyses are useful for finding loop invariants needed for proving
program safety, e.g. when verifying the resource usage of programs or verifying
safety properties related to safe memory access such as checking that all array
accesses are within bounds. We will take Safe Array Access as an example
safety policy and illustrate our approach with the Binary Search example given
in Fig. 1, showing how the analysis will prove that the instruction that accesses
the array vec with index mid will not index out of bounds.
We have annotated the code of Binary Search with the invariants that have
been inferred automatically. Invariants refer to values of local and global vari-
ables and can also refer to the length of an array. For example, the invariant (I3)
asserts among other properties that when entering the while loop, the relation
0 ≤ low < high < |vec| is satisfied. Similarly, the post-condition ensures that
the result is a valid index into the array being searched, or −1, indicating that
INRIA
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// PRE: 0 ≤ |vec0|
static int bsearch(int key, int[] vec) {
// (I1) key0 = key ∧ |vec0| = |vec| ∧ 0 ≤ |vec0|
int low = 0, high = vec.length - 1;
// (I2) key0 = key ∧ |vec0| = |vec| ∧ 0 ≤ low ≤ high + 1 ≤ |vec0|
while (0 < high-low) {
// (I3) key0 = key ∧ |vec0| = |vec| ∧ 0 ≤ low < high < |vec0|
int mid = (low + high) / 2;
// (I4) key0 = key∧ |vec0| = |vec| ∧ 0 ≤ low < high < |vec0| ∧ low+ high− 1 ≤ 2 · mid ≤
low + high
if (key == vec[mid]) return mid;
else if (key < vec[mid]) high = mid - 1;
else low = mid + 1;
// (I5) key0 = key ∧ |vec0| = |vec| ∧ −2 + 3 · low ≤ 2 · high + mid ∧ −1 + 2 · low ≤
high + 2 · mid ∧ −1 + low ≤ mid ≤ 1 + high ∧ high ≤ low + mid ∧ 1 + high ≤ 2 · low + mid ∧
1 + low + mid ≤ |vec0| + high ∧ 2 ≤ |vec0| ∧ 2 + high + mid ≤ |vec0| + low
}
// (I6) key0 = key ∧ |vec0| = |vec| ∧ low − 1 ≤ high ≤ low ∧ 0 ≤ low ∧ high < |vec0|
return -1;
} // POST: −1 ≤ res < |vec0|
Figure 1: Binary search
the element was not found. In addition, the analysis introduces a 0-indexed
variable (such as e.g. key0 in the example) for each parameter (and also for the
global variables, of which there are none in the example) in order to refer to its
value when entering the procedure. The effect of this is that the invariant on
exit of the program defines a relation between the input and the output of the
procedure, thus yielding a summary relation for the procedure.
2.1 Compressing invariants
Abstract interpretations may give you more information than you need for prov-
ing a particular property. In the case of the Binary Search example, if we are
only interested in proving the validity of array accesses, there are a number of
relations between variables in the invariants that can be forgotten. Reducing
the number of constraints and the number of variables under consideration can
lead to a significant gain in execution time when it comes to checking a pro-
posed invariant. For example, pruning the invariants in Fig. 1 with respect to
this property yields the simpler invariant shown in Fig. 2:
Notice that the inferred loop invariant I ′3 is close to what a specifying pro-
grammer of Binary Search might have come up with, but here produced auto-
matically. We explain pruning of procedures in Section 7.
2.2 Analysing a stack-based language
Polyhedral analysis of While languages is well understood but we want our
framework to be able to analyse byte code programs and not only source code.
We could in theory avoid the problem by transforming the program into three-
address code and treat each stack location as a local variable but this trans-
formation is expensive from an algorithmic point of view, as it increases the
number of times that the relation has to be updated. Instead, we achieve the
effect of this transformation by defining an analysis for stack-oriented byte code
RR n
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// PRE: True
static int bsearch(int key, int[] vec) {
// (I′
1
) |vec0| = |vec| ∧ 0 ≤ |vec0|
int low = 0, high = vec.length - 1;
// (I′
2
) |vec0| = |vec| ∧ 0 ≤ low ≤ high + 1 ≤ |vec0|
while (0 < high-low) {
// (I′3) |vec0| = |vec| ∧ 0 ≤ low < high < |vec0|
int mid = (low + high) / 2;
// (I′4) |vec| − |vec0| = 0 ∧ low ≥ 0 ∧ mid− low ≥ 0∧
// 2 · high − 2 · mid− 1 ≥ 0 ∧ |vec0| − high − 1 ≥ 0
if (key == vec[mid]) return mid;
else if (key < vec[mid]) high = mid - 1;
else low = mid + 1;
// (I′
5
) |vec0| = |vec| ∧ −1 + low ≤ high ∧ 0 ≤ low ∧ 5 + 2 · high ≤ 2 · |vec|
}
// (I′6) 0 ≤ |vec0|
return -1;
} // POST: −1 ≤ res < |vec0|
Figure 2: Binary search after invariant pruning
that combines relational abstract interpretation with symbolic execution, fol-
lowing an idea previously used for analysing Java byte code by Xi and Xia
[28] and Wildmoser et al [24]. This technique abstracts the environment of lo-
cal variables by a relation (e.g., a polyhedron) and replace the operand stack
with a stack of symbolic expressions used to “decompile” the operations on the
operand stack. For example, the comparison of variables low and high will be
compiled to the byte codes below, which are analysed in a state consisting of
the relation I2 as defined in Fig. 1 and an abstract stack that evolves as values
are pushed onto the stack.
[] I2
7 : ipush 0 0 I2
8 : iload high high :: 0 I2
9 : iload low low :: high :: 0 I2
10 : isub (high−low) :: 0 I2
11 : if icmpge 56 [] I3
Before the comparison in instruction 11, the stack top contains the expression
high−low, reflecting that in the real execution the stack top at this point will
contain the value of this expression. When we learn from the test that the
expression high>low evaluates to true in the state immediately following the
comparison (and only then), we update the relation accordingly to obtain in-
variant I3. Similarly, we have to update the relation when assigning a new value
to a variable. For example, the instruction that assigns (high+low)/2 to mid is
compiled and analysed as shown below. Again, the relation I3 is only updated
when the assignment to mid is done, to yield relation I4.
INRIA
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[] I3
14 : iload low low I3
15 : iload high high :: low I3
16 : iadd (high+low) I3
17 : ipush 2 2 :: (high+low) I3
18 : idiv ((high+low)/2) I3
19 : istore mid [] I4
More generally, with the abstract stack of expressions, only the comparisons and
assignment to variables require updating the relation. In a polyhedron-based
analysis this is a substantial saving.
2.3 Result checking with certificates
Checking an invariant obtained by computing a post-fixpoint of an abstract
interpretation is in theory simple as it only requires one more iteration to check
that it is indeed a post-fixpoint. In addition, only invariants at certain program
points such as loop headers are required for re-building an entire invariant in one
iteration. Lightweight Bytecode Verification by Rose [22] and the more general
Abstraction-Carrying Code by Albert, Puebla and Hermenegildo [1] exploit this
to construct efficient checkers for invariant-based program certificates. For the
code in Fig. 2, only I ′2 is required.
The inference of invariants using our relational analysis uses an iterative fix-
point solver over an abstract domain of polyhedra and is in principle amenable
to the same technique. However, despite efficient implementations of basic poly-
hedral operations, the algorithmic complexity of operations such a computing
the least upper bound (i.e. the convex hull) of two polyhedra remains high, and
certifying them in a proof assistant would be a major undertaking.
Instead, we propose an enriched certificate format which has the virtue of
being simpler to check, at the cost of sending more information than in basic
fixpoint reconstruction. We exploit that, for the checker, the only important
property of the convex hull operators is that it produces an upper bound of two
polyhedra and therefore can be replaced by inclusion checks with respect to an
upper bound that is proposed by the certificates. Upper bounds are computed
at join points so in Fig. 2 we would also supply I ′5.
Safety checks also reduces to inclusions of polyhedra as verifying the array
access vec[mid] amounts to ensuring that I ′4 implies 0 ≤ mid < |vec|. By
simple propositional reasoning, this reduces to proving that the linear systems
of constraints −mid− 1 ≥ 0∧ I ′4 and mid− |vec| ≥ 0∧ I
′
4 have no solution. Due
to a result by Farkas, such problems can be checked efficiently using certificates
by a simple matrix computation. The key insight is that unsolvability follows
from the existence of a positive combination of the constraints which yield a
strict negative constant. This would lead to a contradiction because the sum
and product of positive quantities cannot be strictly negative. The certificate is
therefore a vector which records the coefficients of the positive combination. For
example, the certificate [2;2;0;0;1;2] proves that the constraints mid−|vec| ≥
0 ∧ I ′4 are unsatisfiable, as the expression
2 · (mid− |vec|) + 2 · (|vec| − |vec0|) + 0 · · · · + 0 · · · ·+
1 · (2 · high− 2 · mid− 1) + 2 · (|vec0| − high− 1)
RR n
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evaluates to −2. We explain these certificates in detail in Section 8.
2.4 Certified certificate checkers
The result checking technique explained above already drastically reduces the
TCB of the analysis result which only rely on the result checker. To further
reduce the TCB, we have machine-checked the result checker of our analysis in
the Coq proof assistant. The main components of the formalisation are
1. a predicate Safe:program→Prop which models the safe programs with re-
spects to the the semantics described in Section 4,
2. a function checker:program→certificate→bool, which checks the safety
of a program using a certificate containing a (partial) result of an analysis
and some inclusion certificates,
3. a machine checked proof establishing the correctness of the checker:
Theorem checker_correct :
∀ p cert, checker p cert = true → Safe p.
The Trusted Computed Base is hence reduced to the Coq type checker and the
formal definition of program safety.
Once the certified result checker is verified (by the Coq type checker) and
installed by the code consumer, two scenarios can be envisaged to verify the
safety of programs sent by producers. In the first one, the consumer may use an
efficient Ocaml version of the checker, extracted from the Coq version thanks
to the Coq extraction mechanism. The other alternative is related to proof by
reflection. For each program p and certificate cert the consumer may build a
foundational Coq proof of Safe p. To do so he only has to check in Coq the
term checker_correct p cert refl_eqtrue where refl_eqtrue denotes a proof
of true=true. It is the role of the Coq reduction engine to verify during type
checking if true=true is equivalent to checker p cert = true by running the
checker inside Coq. In this way we combine two desirable features which are
often difficult to reconcile in state-of-the art Proof Carrying Code: foundational
proofs and small certificates.
3 Notations
Let A and B be sets. If A and B are disjoint then A + B is the disjoint sum of
A and B. We write A⊥ the set A + {⊥}. For f ∈ A → B⊥, dom(f) = {a ∈ A |
f(x) 6= ⊥}. Let f ∈ A → B, f [x 7→ v] is the function identical to f everywhere
except for x for which it returns v. The notation [x1 7→ v1; . . . ; xn → vn] stands
for a function f of domain {x1, . . . , xn} such that f(xi) = vi. A∗ is the set of
lists of elements of A. We write [] for the empty list and a0 :: . . . :: an−1 is a
list l of length n (|l| = n) whose head (resp. tail) is a0 (resp. an−1). l[i] is the
i-th element of l. We write ai the list that is the repetition of a, i times. Let
V , W be totally ordered sets. For x ∈ V , ιV (x) is the index of x in set V and
ι−1V is the inverse function. We abuse notations and identify A
|V | with V → A
i.e., given a finite ordered set, V = {x1, . . . , xn} such that x1 < . . . < xn, we
identify the finite mapping [x1 7→ v1, . . . xn 7→ vn] with the n-tuple (v1, . . . , vn).
INRIA
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We will write AV to denote both A|V | and V → A. Let ρ ∈ AV and V ′ ⊆ V ,
ρ|V ′ ∈ A
V ′ is the restriction of e over the variables of V ′ such that for all x ∈ V ′,
ρ|V ′(x) = e(x). Given V and W disjoint set of variables, ρ1 ∈ A
V and e2 ∈ AW ,
we write ρ1 ⊕ ρ2 ∈ AV +W for the finite mapping such that (ρ1 ⊕ ρ2)|V = ρ1
and (ρ1 ⊕ ρ2)|W = ρ2. Let W and W
′ ordered sets of same cardinality. If
ρ ∈ AV +W , then ρW→W ′ ∈ AV +W
′
is obtained by renaming the variables of
W to the variables in W ′. Formally, we have ρW→W ′ (x) = ρ(x) if x ∈ V and
ρW→W ′(x) = ρ(ι
−1
W (ιW ′ (x))) if x ∈ W
′. To make the distinction clear between
syntactic expressions and values, syntactic expressions are bracketed (
x
·
y
). For
example, we write x1 + ey a syntactic expression built by applying the + operator
to the constant 1 and the syntactic expression e.
4 A byte code language and its semantics
We use a simple stack-based byte code language to illustrate our ideas. Features
include integers, dynamically created (unidimensional) array of integers, static
methods (procedures) and static fields (global variables).
Programs are lists of methods and a method consists of a name, a number
of arguments and a list of instructions. In the following, f ranges over the set S
of static field names, r ranges over the set R = {r0, . . . , r|R|} of local variables
and id ranges over the set MethId of method names. Moreover, i and n range
over N or Z depending on the context and p is used for control points.
P ∈ Prog = Meth∗
m ∈ Meth = Sig × Code
Sig = MethId× N
c ∈ Code = Instr∗
instr ∈ Instr
instr ::= Nop | Ipush n | Iinc r n where n ∈ Z
Pop | Dup | Ineg | Iadd | Isub | Imult | Idiv
Load r | Store r
Getstatic f | Putstatic f
Newarray | Arraylength | Iaload | Iastore
Goto p | If icmp cond p
where cond ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤}
Invoke sig where sig ∈ Sig
Iinput | Return
The instruction set has operators for integer arithmetic and for manipulating
local variable, static fields and an operand stack. Instructions on arrays permit
to create, obtain the size of, access and update arrays. The flow of control can
be modified unconditionally (with Goto), and conditionally with the family of
conditional instructions If icmp cond which compare the top elements of the
run-time stack and branch according to the outcome. Input of data is modelled
with the instruction Iinput . The inter-procedural layer of the language contains
an instruction Invoke for invoking a method and an instruction Return which
transfers control to the calling method, and, at the same time returns the top
of the operand stack as result by pushing it onto the operand stack of the caller
(see the operational semantics below).
RR n
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A program state is composed of a frame stack, the value of static fields and
a heap of arrays and has the form <(m, p, s, l)∗, g, h>. Each frame is a triple
composed of a method m, a control point p to be executed next, an operand
stack s local to a frame and l a partial mapping from local variables to values.
The global heap h is used for storing allocated arrays and is modelled as a
partial function from memory locations to arrays. A special error state Error
models the run-time error arising from indexing an array outside its bounds.
ref ∈ Location
v ∈ Val = Z + Location
s ∈ Stack = Val∗
l ∈ LocVar = R → Val
a ∈ Array = Z∗
h ∈ Heap = Location → Array⊥
g ∈ Static = S → Val
Frame = Meth × N × Stack × LocVar
State = Frame∗ × Static × Heap
+ {Error}
The byte code language is given an operational semantics via a transition
relation → between states. Some of the rules of the definition of → are shown
in Fig. 3. In the semantics, for a method m = ((id, n), c), we write m[p] for c[p].
Note that the language is untyped: registers and fields may (and will) point
successively to values of different types during execution. Instructions that re-
quire arguments with a certain type get stuck in case of error. Also, the number
of registers |R| is the same for all methods. Unused registers and uninitialised
fields have the value 0. Finally, we only consider states <st, g, h> such that
every location appearing in st, g is in dom(h), which is clearly preserved by the
semantics in Fig. 3.
5 Relational analysis of byte code
In this section, we describe a generic, relational analysis for byte code, parame-
terised with respect to a numeric relational domain used to abstract the values
of the local and global variables of the program.
5.1 Symbolic analysis of the stack
Rather than treating each stack location as a new local variable and include this
variable in the numeric abstraction describing the state, we integrate a symbolic
de-compilation into the analysis that abstracts a stack location by a symbolic
expression describing how the value at that stack location is computed from the
values of the local variables. The operand stack is hence abstracted by a stack
of symbolic expressions which represents relation between operands, static fields
and local variables.
The following definition of expressions and guards has two purposes: they
form the basis of the abstract domain for stacks (Expr only), which is specific to
stack-based byte code, and they serve as the interface with the numeric relational
domain, which is parametric. Note that those two aspects of the analysis are
INRIA
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s, l, g, h
Ipush n
−→ n :: s, l, g, h n2 :: n1 :: s, l, g, h
Iadd
−→ n1 + n2 :: s, l, g, h
l(r) = n
s, l, g, h
Iinc r i
−→ s, l[r 7→ n + i], g, h s, l, g, h
Load r
−→ l(r) :: s, l, g, h
v :: s, l, g, h
Store r
−→ s, l[r 7→ v], g, h s, l, g, h
Getstatic f
−→ g(f) :: s, l, g, h
h(ref ) = ⊥ n ≥ 0
n :: s, l, g, h
Newarray
−→ ref :: s, l, g, h[ref 7→ 0n]
h(ref ) = a 0 ≤ i < |a|
i :: ref :: s, l, g, h
Iaload
−→ a[i] :: s, l, g, h
h(ref ) = a ¬ 0 ≤ i < |a|
i :: ref :: s, l, g, h
Iaload
−→ Error
m[p] = instr s, l, g, h
instr
−→ s′, l′, g′, h′
<(m, p, s, l) :: st, g, h> →P <(m, p + 1, s′, l′) :: st, g′, h′>
m[p] = If icmp cond p’ n1 cond n2
<(m, p, n2 :: n1 :: s, l) :: st, g, h> →P <(m, p′, s, l) :: st, g, h>
m[p] = If icmp cond p’ ¬ n1 cond n2
<(m, p,n2 :: n1 :: s, l) :: st, g, h> →P <(m, p + 1, s, l) :: st, g, h>
m[p] = Invoke (mn,n) m′ = ((mn, n), c) ∈ P
<(m, p, (vn−1 :: . . . :: v0 :: s), l) :: st, g, h> →P
<m′, 0, [], [r0 7→ v0; . . . ; rn−1 7→ vn−1; rn 7→ 0; . . . ; r|R| 7→ 0] :: (m, p, s, l) :: st, g, h>
m[p] = Return
<(m, p, v :: s, l) :: (m′ , p′, s′, l′) :: st, g, h> →P <(m′, p′+1, v :: s′, l′) :: st, g, h>
Figure 3: Operational semantics of the byte code language
completely independent apart from that.
ExprV 3 e ::= n | x | ? | e  e x ∈ V,  ∈ {+,−,×, /}
GuardV 3 t ::= e on e on∈ {=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥}
The expression ? represents an unknown value and is responsible for the non-
deterministic evaluation of expressions. Analyses will use this expression to
model interactive inputs and abstract away numeric quantities not in the scope
of the analysis. For instance, our analysis will not keep track of values stored
in arrays.
The semantics JeKρ and JtKρ of expressions and guards with respect to an
environment ρ ∈ V → Z are given below.
JnKρ = {n} JxKρ = {ρ(x)} J?Kρ = Z
Je1e2Kρ = {n1  n2 | n1 ∈ Je1K, n2 ∈ Je2K}
Je1one2Kρ ⇐⇒ ∃ n1 ∈ Je1Kρ, n2 ∈ Je2Kρ n1 on n2
Note that this is not the whole concretisation function for symbolic expressions,
which is described later (see Fig. 4).
Symbolic stacks Concrete operand stacks are abstracted by lists of symbolic
expressions. To deal correctly with values which are returned after a method
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call we use auxiliary variables in a given set A, so the symbolic abstract domain
for stacks is Expr∗R+S+A.
5.2 Numeric relational domain specification
Apart from symbolic expressions stacks, the byte code analysis is specified with
respect to an abstract numeric relational interface (defined below) that can
be instantiated with standard relational abstract domains. We thus assume a
domain D parameterised over a (finite) totally ordered set of variables V .
Language independent operators An abstract element is mapped to a
set of environments in ZV by the concretisation function γ : DV → P(ZV ).
To manage sets of variables, D is equipped with a projection operator ∃V ′ :
DV +V ′ → DV , an extension operator EV ′ : DV → DV +V ′ and a renaming
operator ·W→W ′ : DV +W → DV +W ′ .The abstract domain is also equipped
with a partial order v ⊆ DV × DV and meet and upper bound operators
u,t : DV × DV → DV . These components are language-independent.
Language dependent operators The abstract assignment of an expression
e ∈ ExprV to a variable x ∈ V is modelled by the operator Jx := eK] : DV → DV .
A guard t ∈ GuardV may be abstracted by two operators assume](t), ensure](t) :
Dv : the assume
] operator computes an over-approximation of the guard, while
ensure] computes an under-approximation.
Definition 5.1 states formally the requirements over the operators of abstract
domain DV .
Definition 5.1. An abstract domain D is a family of sets DV with:
  a concretisation function γ : DV → P(ZV ),
  a decidable ordering relation v ⊆ DV × DV such that
d v d′ ⇒ γ(d) ⊆ γ(d′),
  a projection ∃V ′ : DV +V ′ → DV , an extension EV ′ : DV → DV +V ′ and a
renaming ·W→W ′ : DV +W → DV +W ′ operators such that:
γ(∃V ′(d)) = {ρ|V | ρ ∈ γ(d)}
γ(EV ′(d)) = {ρ | ρ|V ∈ γ(d)}
γ(dW→W ′ ) = {ρW→W ′ | ρ ∈ γ(d)} ,
  a meet operator u : DV × DV → DV such that
γ(d u d′) = γ(d) ∩ γ(d′),
  an upper bound operator t : DV × DV → DV such that
γ(d t d′) ⊇ γ(d) ∪ γ(d′),
INRIA
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  an abstract assignment operator Jx := eK] : DV → DV s.t.
γ(Jx := eK](d)) ⊇ {ρ[x 7→ v] | ρ ∈ γ(d) ∧ v ∈ JeKρ},
  assume], ensure] : GuardV → DV such that
γ(ensure](t)) ⊆ {ρ | JtKρ} ⊆ γ(assume](t)).
With the operator assume# of the numerical domain we define the abstract
test JtK] : DV → DV of a guard t ∈ GuardV by:
Jeone′K](l]) = assume](eone′) u l] if on∈ {=, <,≤, >,≥}
Je6=e′K](l]) = (assume](e′<e) u l]) t (assume](e<e′) u l])
The specific rule for 6= is necessary to ensure a good precision with convex
polyhedra.
5.3 Analysis specification
The byte code analysis is defined by specifying for each byte code an abstract
transfer function which maps abstract states to abstract states (for non-jumping
intraprocedural instruction at least). The abstract states are pairs of the form
(s], l]) where l] is a relation between local, global and auxiliary variables and s]
is an abstract stack whose elements are symbolic expressions built from these
variables. More precisely, the analysis manipulates the following sets of vari-
ables:
R: set of local variables r0, . . . , r|L|−1 of methods,
R0: set of old local variables r
old
0 , . . . , r
old
|P |−1 of methods, representing their
initial values t the beginning of method execution,
S: set of static fields f0, . . . , f|S|−1 of the program
S0: set of old static fields f
old
0 , . . . , f
old
|S|−1 of the program used to model values
of static fields at the beginning of method execution
A: set of auxiliary variable aux 0, . . . , aux |A|−1 used to keep track of results
of methods in the symbolic operand stack
Moreover, we use a “primed” version X ′ of the variable set X for renaming
purposes. For each method the analysis computes a signature Pre → Post
whose meaning is
if the method is called with in a context where its arguments and
the static fields satisfy the property Pre then if the method returns,
then its result, its arguments, and the initial and final values of static
fields satisfy the property Post .
Preconditions are actually chosen by over-approximating the context in which
each method may actually be invoked. Additionally the analysis computes at
each control point of each method a local invariant between the current (R)
and initial (R0) values of local variables, the current (S) and initial (S0) values
of static fields, and some auxiliary variables (A) which are used temporarily to
remember results of method calls which are still on the stack
RR n
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instr Finstr
Nop (s], l]) → (s], l])
Ipush n (s], l]) →
`
n :: s], l]
´
Pop (e :: s], l]) →
`
s], l]
´
Dup (e :: s], l]) →
`
e :: e :: s], l]
´
Iadd (e2 :: e1 :: s], l]) →
`
xe2 + e1y :: s
], l]
´
Isub (e2 :: e1 :: s], l]) →
`
xe2 − e1y :: s
], l]
´
Imult (e2 :: e1 :: s], l]) →
`
xe2 × e1y :: s
], l]
´
Idiv (e2 :: e1 :: s], l]) →
`
xe2/e1y :: s
], l]
´
Ineg (e :: s], l]) →
`
x0 − ey :: s
], l]
´
Iinput (s], l]) → (? :: s], l])
Load r (s], l]) →
`
xry :: s
], l]
´
Store r (e :: s], l]) →
`
s][?/r], Jr := eK](l])
´
Getstatic f (s], l]) →
`
xfy :: s
], l]
´
Putstatic f (e :: s], l]) →
`
s][?/f ], Jf := eK](l])
´
Iinc r n (s], l]) →
`
s][xr − ny/r], Jr := r + nK](l])
´
Newarray (e :: s], l]) →
`
e :: s], l]
´
Arraylength (e :: s], l]) →
`
e :: s], l]
´
Iaload (e2 :: e1 :: s], l]) →
`
? :: s], l]
´
Iastore (e3 :: e2 :: e1 :: s], l]) →
`
s], l]
´
m[p] = instr 6∈ {Goto p’, If icmp cond p’, Invoke sig,Return}
Finstr(Loc(m, p)) v Loc(m, p + 1)
m[p] = Goto p
Loc(m, p) v Loc(m, p)
m[p] = If icmp cond p’ Loc(m, p) = (e2 :: e1 :: s], l])
`
s], Je1 cond e2K](l])
´
v Loc(m, p′)
m[p] = If icmp cond p’ Loc(m, p) = (e2 :: e1 :: s], l])
“
s], Je1 cond e2K](l])
”
v Loc(m, p + 1)
m[p] = Invoke (mn,n) ((m’,n),c’) ∈ P Loc(m, p) = (en−1 :: · · · :: e0 :: s], l])
“
∃R+S0+A
“dn−1
i=0 assume
](ei = roldi ) u ∃R0(l
])
””
S→S0
v Pre((mn , n), c′)
m[p] = Invoke sig (sig,c’) ∈ P Loc(m, p) = (en−1 :: · · · :: e0 :: s], l])
0
B
B
@
xaux jy :: s
][?/aux j ],
∃S′+{res}Jaux j := resK
0
@
l]
S→S′
u ∃R0
„ dn−1
i=0 assume
](ei = roldi )S→S′
u Post(sig , c′)S0→S′
«
1
A
1
C
C
A
v Loc(m, p + 1)
where p is the index of the j−th Invoke in m
m[p] = Return Loc(m, p) = (e :: s], l])
∃R+A(Jres := eK](l])) v Post(m)
(m, n, c) ∈ P
d|S|−1
i=0 assume
](fi = foldi )
dn−1
i=0 assume
](roldi = ri) u Pre(m) v Loc(m, 0)
((main, 0), c) ∈ P
> v Pre((main, 0), c)
Figure 4: Relational byte code analysis with stack de-compilation
Definition 5.2 (Abstract domain). The abstract value for a program P is de-
scribed by an element (Pre,Post ,Loc) of the lattice
State# = Meth → DR0+S0
× Meth → DR0+S0+S+{res}
× Meth × N →
(
ExprR+S+A
? × DR0+S0+R+S+A
)
⊥
The analysis is specified as a solution of a constraint (inequation) sys-
tem associated to each program. The constraint system is formally defined
INRIA
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in Fig 4. Note that extensions are left implicit. For non-jumping intraproce-
dural instructions, the constraint is defined via a transfer function in Expr ? ×
DR0+S0+R+S+A → (Expr
? ×DR0+S0+R+S+A)⊥. We (ab)use notation and write
(e :: s], l]) →
(
e :: e :: s], l]
)
for the function that maps a state of the form
(e :: s], l]) to the resulting state
(
e :: e :: s], l]
)
and other states to ⊥. The anal-
ysis maintains a symbolic version of the operand stack and most of the transfer
functions are defined as symbolic executions. The transfer functions for the
stack operations Nop, Pop and Dup mimic the semantics of those operations so
e.g., Dup will duplicate the expression on top of the (abstract) operand stack
and hence is abstracted by the function (e :: s], l]) →
(
e :: e :: s], l]
)
. The ab-
straction of the instruction Load r for fetching the value of local variable r just
pushes the expression xry onto the abstract stack (rather than projecting an ab-
stract value of r from the relation describing the local variables). Similarly, the
abstraction of the addition operation Iadd pops the two topmost expressions e1
and e2 from the abstract stack and replaces them with the symbolic expression
x
e2 + e1y.
The transfer function for the Store r operation updates the abstract envi-
ronment of local variables with the constraint that r is now equal to the value
given by the expression e on top of the abstract stack top. Formally, this is
done using the operation Jx := eK] provided by the interface of the relational
domain. By the same token, all occurrences of the sub-expression
x
x
y
in the
abstract stack become invalid, as r now (potentially) has changed value, and
are replaced by the “don’t know” expression x?y. The analysis abstracts arrays
references by the length of the referenced array, so the transfer functions for
Newarray(which takes the length as argument and returns a reference to the
created array) becomes the identity function. Similarly for Arraylength .
For all non-jumping instructions, we generate a constraint saying that the
state following the instruction should include the result of applying the transfer
function of the instruction to the state preceding the instruction. For the con-
ditional If icmp cond p’, we use the abstract tests provided by the relational
domain to take the outcome of the test into account, so e.g., at program point
p′ we know that the condition cond holds between the two top elements of the
stack. If these are given by expressions e1 and e2 then we know that the sym-
bolic expression xe1 cond e2y evaluates to true in the current environment. The
expression Je1 cond e2K](l]) in the rule for conditionals updates the environment
of local variables (l] to take this information into account. A similar constraint
is generated for the program point p + 1 using this time the negation cond of
the condition cond.
The analysis of method calls is the most complicated part. The complications
partly arise because we have several kinds of variables (static fields, local and
auxiliary variables) whose different scope must be catered for. The analysis
gives rise to two constraints: one that relates the state before the call to the
pre-condition of the method and one that registers the impact of the call on the
state immediately following the call site.
When invoking a method m′ from method m, we compute an abstract state
that holds before starting executing m′ and which constrains the Pre(m′) com-
ponent of the abstract element describing m′. This state registers that the n
topmost expressions e1, . . . , en on the abstract stack corresponds to the actual
arguments that will be bound to the local variables of the callee m′, by inject-
RR n
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ing the constraints ei = r
old
i into the relational domain and adding them to the
current state as given by l]. Care must be exercised not to confound the pa-
rameters R0 of the caller with the parameters of the callee, hence the projecting
out of R0 before joining the constraints. Furthermore, the local variables R,
the initial values of static fields S0 and the auxiliary variables A of method m
have a different meaning in the context of method m′ and are removed from the
abstract state at the start of m′ too. Finally, the current value of static fields S
in m at the point of the method call becomes the initial value of the static fields
when analysing m′, hence the renaming of S into S0. The entire start state for
m′ is thus described by the expression
(
∃R+S0+A
(
l
i
assume](ei = r
old
i ) u ∃R0(l
])
))
S→S0
The second rule for Invoke describes the impact of the method call on its
successor state. We use an auxiliary variable aux j (chosen to be free in s
#) to
name the result of a method call which is pushed onto the stack. This variable
is constrained to be equal to the variable res which receives the value returned
by m′. The rest of the left-hand side expression of the constraint
l]S→S′ u ∃R0
(
l
i
assume](ei = r
old
i )S→S′ u Post(m
′)S0→S′
)
serves to link the post-condition Post(m′) of the method with the state l] of
the call site. These are linked via the local variables xi constrained to be equal
to the argument expressions ei and via the global static fields S. Again, some
renaming and hiding of variables is required: e.g., the initial values of the static
fields in m′, referred to by S0, correspond to the values of the static fields before
the call in the state l] and in the expressions ei, referred to by S. The renamings
S0 → S′ and S → S′, respectively, ensures that these values are identified.
Two rules are used to initiate the analysis of a method (constraint on
Loc(m, 0)) and of the entire program (constraint on Pre((main, n), c)). To ini-
tialise the analysis of a method m, the precondition Pre(m) is conjoined with
the constraints linking the variable foldi to the current value of the static field fi
and linking the parameters roldi with the local variables ri, in accordance with
how parameters are handled in e.g. Java byte code. The analysis of the main
method starts in the completely unconstrained state >.
5.4 Inference
The constraint system presented in the previous section can be turned into a
post-fixpoint problem by standard techniques. Consequently, the solutions of
the system can be characterised as the set of post-fixpoints {x | F ](x) v x}
of a suitable monotone operator F ] ∈ State] → State] operating on the global
abstract domain State] of the analysis. Assuming that State] is a complete
lattice1 we know that the least solution lfpF ] of this problem exists and can
be over-approximated by any post-fixpoint of F ]. Computing such a post-
fixpoint is the role of chaotic iterations [12] which operate on the equation
1For the polyhedra abstract domain this assumption is too strong but we can relax it by
considering a complete lattice containing State] and all its upper bounds [13].
INRIA
Result certification for relational program analysis 17
system associated with the constraint system and choose a suitable iteration
strategy [8]. Iteration is sped up by using widening on well-chosen control
points. Neither the iteration strategy nor the widening operators belong to the
TCB since the validity of the result can be checked with a post-fixpoint test.
5.5 Safety checks
Once the analysis has inferred correct invariants, this information is used to
check if they enforce the suitable safety policy. In a context of array bound
checking we must check that each array access is within the bounds of the
array. As a consequence, for each occurence of an instruction Iaload or Iastore
at a program point (m, pc), we test if the local invariant Loc(m, pc) computed
by the analysis ensures a safe array access.
Definition 5.3 (Abstract safety checks). We say a set of local invariant Loc ∈
(N → (Expr? × DP+S0+L+S+A)⊥) verifies all safety checks of a program if and
only if
∀m ∈ P, pc ∈ N,
m[p] = Iaload ⇒
Loc(m, pc) = (e2 :: e1 :: s
], l]) ⇒
l] v ensure](
x
0 ≤ e2y) ∧ l
] v ensure](
x
e2 < e1y)
∧
m[p] = Iastore ⇒
Loc(m, pc) = (e3 :: e2 :: e1 :: s
], l]) ⇒
l] v ensure](
x
0 ≤ e2y) ∧ l
] v ensure](
x
e2 < e1y)
5.6 Soundness of the analysis
Fig. 5 gives the concretisation functions for the abstract domains. The auxiliary
abstraction function β maps everything to an integer, abstracting arrays by
their length. γexpr defines concretisation of a symbolic expression with respect
to an environment. γPre maps pre-conditions to sets of calling contexts, γPost
maps post-conditions to relations between calling contexts and return contexts,
and γLoc maps local invariants to relations between calling contexts and local
program states. Note that concretisations contain only states such that all
locations that are being referenced are defined in the heap.
Definition 5.4 (Reachable states). For a method m in a program P , a heap
h, a static heap g, a set of local variables l, a frame stack st, the set JP Kmh,g,l,st
of reachable state from an execution of m starting in an initial configuration
(h, g, l, st) is defined by
JP Kmh,g,l,st =
{
s | <(m, 0, [], l′) :: st, g, h>
≥st
−−→
∗
P s
}
where
≥st
−−→
∗
P is the reflexive transitive closure of →P restricted to states who
have a form < . . . :: (m, . . .) :: st, . . . >.
The purpose of
≥st
−−→
∗
P is to collect only the states in between the start and
the end of the execution of a particular stack frame.
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βV : Heap × (V → Val) → (V → Z⊥)
(h, z) 7→ λx. z(x) if z(x) ∈ Z
|h(z(x))| if z(x) ∈ dom(h)
γ
expr
h,g,l,a
: ExprR+S+A → P(Val), h ∈ Heap, g ∈ Static, l ∈ LocVar
and a ∈ Val → Z
e 7→ JeKβR+S+A(h,l⊕g⊕a)
∪
n
ref ∈ dom(h)
˛
˛
˛ |h(ref )| ∈ JeKβR+S+A(h,l⊕g⊕a)
o
γPre : DR0+S0 → P(Static × Heap × LocVar)
pre 7→
˘
(g0, h0, l0) | βR0+S0 (h0, l0 ⊕ g0) ∈ γ(pre)
¯
γPost : DR0+S0+S+{res} → P((Static × Heap × LocVar) × (Static × Heap × Val))
post 7→

((g0, h0, l0), (g, h, v)) |
βS0+R0+S+{res}(h0, g0 ⊕ l0 ⊕ g ⊕ [res 7→ v]) ∈ γ(post)
ff
γLoc :
Expr?
× DR0+S0+R+S+A
→ P
„
(Static × Heap × LocVar)
× (Static × Heap × Stack × LocVar)
«
(e1 :: · · · :: en, loc) 7→
8
<
:
((g0, h0, l0), (g, h, v1 :: · · · :: vn, l)) |
∃a ∈ A → Z, ∀i ∈ J1, nK, vi ∈ γ
expr
h,g,l,a
(ei) ∧
βS0+R0+S+R+A(h0, g0 ⊕ l0 ⊕ g ⊕ l ⊕ a) ∈ γ(loc)
9
=
;
Figure 5: Concretisation functions
Definition 5.5 (Safe method). A method m in a program P is said to be safe
wrt. a precondition Pre ⊆ Heap ×Static ×LocVar if for all stack frames st and
all (h, g, l) ∈ Pre, Error 6∈ JP Kmh,g,l,st.
Theorem 5.6 (Correctness).
Let P be a program and (Pre ,Post ,Loc) a solution of the constraint system
associated with P . If Loc satisfies all safety checks then every method m in P
is safe wrt. to Pre(m). In particular,
<(((main, n), c), 0, [], λr.0) :: [], λf.0, λref .⊥ > 6→P Error
Proof. The proof is divided into two parts. We first prove that each reachable
intermediate state at a point (m, p) satisfies the property γLoc(Loc(m, p)), that
each method m is called in a context satisfying γPre(Pre(m)) and that its return
value (if it exists) satisfies γPost (Loc(m)). In the second part we prove that if a
state at some point (m, p) satisfies γLoc(Loc(m, p)) as well as the abstract safety
check associated with this point, then no error happens in the next semantic
step. To deal with the steps corresponding to procedure calls, the proof makes
use of an intermediate big-step operational semantics. Details are omitted for
lack of space.
6 Polyhedral analysis
We now instantiate the relational analysis framework using linear relations in the
form of convex polyhedra. Polyhedral program analysis has a well-established
theory [13] with several implementations [4, 15]. Here, we recall the basics of
this theory.
Definition 6.1. Convex polyhedra of dimension n (Pn ⊆ Qn) are (convex)
subsets of Qn that can be expressed as a finite intersection of half-planes of Qn.
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s1
s2
s3
r1
r2
Figure 6: Dual representation of polyhedra
Polyhedra can be represented as sets of linear constraints. It is desirable
to keep these sets in normal form i.e., without redundant constraints. For this
purpose, polyhedra libraries maintain a dual representation of polyhedra based
on generators in which a convex polyhedron is the convex hull of a (finite) set of
vertices, rays and lines. Vertices, rays and lines are respectively extremal points,
infinite directions and bi-directional infinite directions of the polyhedron. Fig. 6
shows a a polyhedron with four constraints whose dual representation is made
of three vertices (s1,s2,s3) and two rays (r1,r2).
The efficiency of the algorithm that maintains the normal form of the double
description is of crucial importance. For this task, state-of-the-art polyhedral
libraries [4, 15] use Chernikova’s algorithm [11]. In the worst case, the num-
ber of generators is exponential in the number of constraints (and vice-versa)
but, in practise, the double description offers a good performance. To alleviate
further the cost of normalising polyhedra, these libraries switch lazily from one
representation to the other.
Polyhedral cannot directly handle expressions that fall outside the linear
fragment. It would be sound but unsatisfactory to abstract those expressions
towards an arbitrary value i.e., the ? expression. More information can be
retained by linearising expressions [19]. For instance, the precise analysis of
Binary Search (Fig. 1) requires a precise model of euclidean divisions. Given
an integer constant n, the guard y = x/n is abstracted by the linear guards
0 ≤ x − n · y < n. Multiplications can also be linearised by using the range of
variables.
We now briefly explain how polyhedral algorithms implement the abstract
numeric relational domain specified in Definition 5.1. To be implemented effi-
ciently, the double description of polyhedra is needed, using Chernikova’s algo-
rithm to reconstruct the coherence of the double representation.
The convex polyhedron can directly be cast into an abstract numeric domain
by mapping variables of the domain to dimensions of the polyhedron. Hence,
we get DV = P|V | and the concretisation:
γ(P ) = {ρ ∈ ZV | ρ ∈ P ∩ ZV }
Renaming of variables consists in applying a permutation to the dimensions
of polyhedron. The extension operation which add new variables consists in
inserting new unconstrained dimensions at the relevant indexes.
Projections can be efficiently performed on the generator description of poly-
hedra in linear time. Each generator is projected by erasing the now irrelevant
dimensions.
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Intersections are computed by taking the union of the constraints of each
polyhedron.
The convex hull, i.e., least upper bound, is computed by taking the union of
the generators of both polyhedra.
An assignment Jx := eK] is modelled by the linear transformation (if e is
linear) that keeps all the variables unchanged except x which is mapped to e.
The transformation is applied to the generators.
Inclusion tests are using both representation at once. Checking the contain-
ment of two polyhedra (P v Q) amounts to verifying that the generators of P
satisfy the constraints of Q.
Widening operators are used by the fixpoint iterator to ensure convergence.
For convex polyhedra, there exist various widening operators [13, 3].
Assume and ensure operators are responsible for interpreting guards of the
target language. If the guard t is linear, a polyhedron is built from it and no
abstraction takes place. Otherwise, t has to be linearised. In the worst case,
universal (resp. empty) polyhedra can be used as sound (though very imprecise)
fallbacks.
7 Fixpoint pruning
The result of the polyhedral byte code analysis will be a fixpoint of the transfer
functions, representing an invariant of the program under analysis. This invari-
ant will often contain more information than necessary for proving a particular
safety policy such as absence of indexing outside array bounds. In the follow-
ing we show how to prune an invariant with respect to a given safety policy,
resulting in an invariant that is smaller and cheaper to verify.
7.1 Witnesses and pruning
We have applied the technique described in [7] for pruning constraint-based
invariants, with some adaptations allowing to handle our interprocedural poly-
hedral analysis on byte code better. First we recall the definition of witnesses
for this particular analysis.
Definition 7.1. A witness for a program P is a solution (Pre, Post, Loc) to
the constraint system associated with P that satisfies the safety checks of P (see
Definition 5.3).
We use this as the basis for building certificates, relying on the fact that if
there exists a witness for P then P is safe (see Theorem 5.6). Part of the witness
is sent to the checker in the constraint representation only (see Section 6), so we
aim at extracting a weaker witness with fewer linear constraints than the one
produced by the inference algorithm of Section 5.4 (if the analysis is accurate
enough for the program). Pruning leaves the symbolic expression stacks of the
witness unchanged because the checker recomputes them (and hence nothing is
transmitted about this part).
It is easy to see that there is generally no unique weakest witness nor a unique
witness with the minimum number of constraints (because the analysis is not
distributive). Also, the idea of starting from the safety requirements to compute
backward a witness that satisfies them cannot achieve the same precision as a
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prune(w) :=
let w′ = ∅
while w′ is not a witness do
choose a constraint C and k ∈ w′|dep(C) s.t. w
′, {k} 6` C
(or a check C such that w′ 6` C)
choose x ⊆ (w \ w′)|dep(C) such that w′ ∪ x, {k} ` C
(respectively, w′ ∪ x ` C)
w′ := w′ ∪ x
done
return w′
Figure 7: Witness pruning algorithm
forward analysis, because intuitively it would have to guess the invariants that
a forward analysis naturally discovers. For these reasons we use a technique
of pruning that removes as many linear constraints as possible from a given
witness.
7.2 Abstract algorithm
We use a variation of the greedy heuristic presented in [7]. In the following we
identify polyhedra with sets of constraints. We use
Var = {prem | m ∈ P} ∪ {postm | m ∈ P}
∪ {locm,p | m ∈ P, m = ((mn, n), c), p < |c|}
to denote the set of unknowns of the constraint system associated with P . For
an abstract element x = (Pre, Post, Loc) we define the set of linear constraints
of x:
x =
⋃
m∈P
{(locm,p, k) | Loc(m, p) = (s#, l#), k ∈ l#}
∪ {(prem, k) | k ∈ Pre(m)}
∪ {(postm, k) | k ∈ Post(m)}
For V ⊆ Var we define x|V = {(var, k) ∈ x | var ∈ V } and x|V is defined
accordingly.
Recall that the constraint system for P is a set of constraints of the form
F (x) v x|{v} where v ∈ Var . For a constraint c we note x, y ` C if F (x) v y|{v}
(we can do so since the expression stacks are fixed) and x ` C for x, x ` C.
We will overload the notation and write also x ` C if x satisfies the safety
check C. Then, for every such constraint C, we define a set dep(C) ⊆ Var that
represents the dependencies of this constraint, in the sense that if x, y ` C then
x|dep(C), y ` C. The definition of dep is straightforward. For example, if C
is the constraint Finstr(Loc(m, p)) v Loc(m, p + 1) corresponding to an non-
jumping intraprocedural instruction (see the first part of Fig. 4), then dep(C) =
{locm,p}. For the constraint . . . v Loc(m, p + 1) of an Invoke sig instruction,
dep(C) = {locm,p, post(sig,c)} where (sig, c) ∈ P .
The pruning algorithm is shown in Fig. 7. The main issue in this non-
deterministic algorithm is the choice of the subset x: we obviously want a
minimal one in the sense of set inclusion (achievable in reasonable time by
monotonicity), but it is not unique.
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7.3 Efficient pruning for polyhedral byte code analysis
Our strategy is to take a minimal such x that almost minimizes a cost function
taking into account the number of linear constraints, the number of non-null
coefficients in them, and, for Invoke , the number of post constraints (as opposed
to loc). This allows us to obtain a witness with simpler invariants and signatures.
The heuristic blindly applies the definition of ` while labelling (part of) the
search space. The dependency function dep helps by reducing the number of
linear constraints to be considered at each step.
Finally, we face a problem specific to the polyhedra domain when pruning an
invariant: in order to keep things small, the polyhedra are usually represented
in a minimal form in which the relation between a set of dimensions does not
necessarily appear as a dedicated linear constraint, but often as a consequence
of several other relations. For example, the constraint x ≤ z is implicit in
x ≤ y ≤ z. For the purpose of finding a small invariant, we may benefit from
being able to include such constraints. Our solution is to add some implicit
constraints to the invariant before pruning it. More precisely, for a polyhedron
in DV , we add all the projections ∃V \V ′ (see Section 6) where V
′ is a subset of V
of cardinality at most n. For the maximal number n of dimensions in the implicit
constraints to be generated, ∞ seems too costly for non-trivial programs, and
unnecessary. It turns out that 3 is enough for all of our examples, which is not
surprising because very few correctness proofs actually rely on linear invariants
involving more than three variables.
8 Result checking of polyhedral analysis
A result checker for abstract interpretation based static analysis can be reduced
to an (optimised) fixpoint checker [1], with the downside that the abstract do-
mains are still part of the TCB. Formally certifying optimised polyhedral li-
braries [4, 15] is feasible but would require an enormous certification effort.
Instead, we propose a lightweight verifier of polyhedral analyses using a result
checking methodology which has two advantages: i) the TCB is small, and
ii) the checking time is optimised.
8.1 The polyhedral domain revisited
Chernikova’s algorithm is at the origin of the computational complexity of con-
vex polyhedra operations, so a first approach would be to design a result checker
for Chernikova’s algorithm i.e., a normal form checker. This has the inconve-
nience that most of the polyhedral operations would be annotated with their
result together with a certificate attesting that it is in normal form. Instead,
we develop a checker which only uses the constraint representation of polyhedra
and which never need to normalise. Moreover, projections are not computed but
delayed using a set of extra existential variables. More precisely, our polyhedra
are represented by a list of linear expression over two disjoint sets of variables
V and E. Variables in v ∈ V are genuine variables while e ∈ E are (existential)
variables that represent dimensions which have been projected out.
Definition 8.1. Let V and E be disjoint sets of variables.
PV = Lin
∗
V +E
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where
LinV +E = {xc1 × x1 + · · · + cn × xny | ci ∈ Z ∧ xi ∈ V + E}.
Given es ∈ PV , the concretisation function is defined by
γV (es) = {ρ|V | ∀k ∈ es, Jk ≥ 0Kρ}
In the following, we show how to implement the polyhedral operations using
(only) polyhedra in constraint form.
Renaming simply consists in applying the renaming to the expressions within
the polyhedron. Because the existential variables belong to a disjoint set, no
capture can occur. In addition, for this encoding, extension is a no-op because
unused variables have no impact on the internal representation.
es ∈ PV ⇒ ∀W ⊇ V, es ∈ PW
Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see e.g.), [23], projections can be com-
puted directly over the constraint representation of polyhedra However, in the
worst case, the number of constraints grows exponentially in the number of
variables to project. To solve this problem, we delay the projection and sim-
ply register them as existentially quantified. This is done by renaming these
variables to fresh variables.
To compute intersections, care must be taken not to mix up the existential
variables. To avoid capture, existentially variables are renamed to variables
that are fresh for both polyhedra. Thereafter, the intersection is implemented
by taking the union of the expressions.
To implement the assume and ensure operators, the involved expressions are
first linearised and the obtained linear inequality is put into the form e ≥ 0
which now belongs to the set Lin defined above.
For convex polyhedra, assignment is efficiently implemented as an atomic op-
eration. However, it can be expressed in terms of the previous operators: given
x′ a fresh variable, an assignment can be defined as follows.
Jx := eK](P ) =
(
∃{x}
(
P u assume](x′ = e)
))
{x′}→{x}
It is this latter definition that we use.
Widening operators are only used during the fixpoint iteration, and are not
needed at checking time.
Convex Hull is the typical operation that is straightforward to implement
using the generator representation of polyhedra. Using a relaxation technique,
it is possible to express the convex hull as the projection of a polyhedron of
higher dimension [2] but since this requires to compute projections this does
not scale. Even with our delaying of projections, the size of the polyhedron
doubles. Instead of computing a convex hull, we follow the result certification
methodology and provide a certificate polyhedron that is the result of the convex
hull computation. Furthermore, our result checker need not check that the result
is exactly the convex hull but only that it is an upper bound by doing a double
inclusion test.
isUpperBound(P, Q,UB) ≡ P v UB ∧ Q v UB
To implement inclusion tests, we push the result certification methodology
further and use inclusion certificates. The form of certificates and their genera-
tion are described below.
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8.2 Result certification for polyhedral inclusion
Farkas lemma (Lemma 8.2) is a theorem of linear programming (see for instance
[23]) which gives a notion of emptiness certificate for polyhedra. In this part, we
show how this result can be i) lifted to obtain an inclusion checker; ii) extended
further to deal with existential variables. Our inclusion checker vcheck takes as
input a pair of polyhedra (P, Q) and an inclusion certificate. It will only return
true if the certificate allows to conclude that P is indeed included in Q (P v Q).
Lemma 8.2 (Farkas Lemma). Let A ∈ Qm×n and b ∈ Qn. The following
statements are equivalent:
  For all x ∈ Qn, ¬(A · x ≥ b)
  There exists ic ∈ Qm satisfying At · ic = 0̄ and bt · ic > 0.
The soundness (⇐) of certificates is the easy part and is all that is needed in
the machine-checked proof. It follows that the existence of a certificate ensures
the infeasibility of the linear constraints and therefore that the polyhedron made
of these constraints is empty.
Thus, an inclusion certificate ic is a vector of Qm and checking a certificate
consists of 1) computing a matrix-vector product (At · ic) 2) verifying that the
result is a null vector; 3) computing a scalar product (bt · ic); and 4) verifying
that the result is strictly positive. All in all, the certificate checker runs in
quadratic-time in terms of arithmetic operations.
Certificates generation can be recast as a linear programming problem that
can be efficiently solved by either the Simplex or interior point methods. The
set of certificates is characterised by the convex polyhedron
Cert =
{
ic
∣
∣ic ≥ 0̄ ∧ bt · ic > 0 ∧ At · ic = 0̄
}
As a result, finding an extremal certificate amounts to solving a linear optimi-
sation problem. For instance, the solution of the linear program min{ct · 1̄ | c ∈
Cert} minimises the sum of the coefficients of the certificate. In theory, such a
minimisation might not yield a compact certificate because the optimisation is
done over the rationals – there are very small rationals that require many bits.
However, in practise, the technique is sufficiently efficient.
From emptiness to inclusion Lemma 8.3 states that in the absence of ex-
istential variables an inclusion check amounts to emptiness checks.
Lemma 8.3. Given P, P ′ ∈ PV +E, we have
∀e′ ∈ P ′, γV +E(−e
′−1 :: P ) = ∅
if and only if
γV +E(P ) ⊆ γV +E(P
′).
Proof. By construction, polyhedra in PV +E do not have existential variables.
Hence, we have γV +E(P
′) =
⋂
e′∈P ′ γV +E(e
′::[]). Moreover, the complement of
a linear constraint e′ ≥ 0 is −e′ − 1 ≥ 0. These facts allow to reduce inclusion
to a set of emptiness tests.
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Lemma 8.4 states that to do an inclusion test, it is sound to drop existential
variables.
Lemma 8.4. Let P and P ′ be polyhedra in constraint form.
γV +E(P ) ⊆ γV +E(P
′) ⇒ γV (P ) ⊆ γV (P
′)
Proof. The Lemma follows from the definition of γ and the fact that the restric-
tion operator on environments is monotone.
Together, Lemma 8.3 and Lemma 8.4 allow the design of a sound result
checker for inclusion tests of form P ⊆ P ′. In general, the checker is incomplete
but this only shows up in cases where P ′ has existential variables. However,
inclusions only need to be certified when P ′ is a polyhedron computed by the
analyser and such a P ′ does not contain existential variables, so the inclusion
checker is always used in a context where it is complete.
9 Implementation and Experiments
The relational byte code analysis has been implemented in Caml and instanti-
ated with the efficient NewPolka polyhedral library [15] as its relational abstract
domain. As the language presented in Section 4 is compatible with Java byte
code, we analyse programs that are compiled from genuine Java programs. The
result checker for polyhedral analysis described in Section 8 has been imple-
mented in the Coq proof assistant.
The analyser computes a solution to the constraint system generated from
a program and passes it on to the fixpoint pruning algorithm. From the com-
pressed invariants, loop headers and join points are extracted and the inclusion
certificates required by the checker are produced using the Simplex algorithm. A
binary form of loop headers, join point invariants and their inclusion certificates
constitute the final program certificate.
In Fig 8, we give a table of some of the benchmarks used by Xi to demonstrate
the dependent type system for Xanadu [27]. HeapSort and QuickSort are partic-
ularly good illustrations of the capacities of our analysis for analysing automat-
ically programs mixing recursive procedures and loops. The programs and the
analysis results can be found at http://www.irisa.fr/lande/polycert.html.
.class certificates checking time
Program before after before after
BSearch 515 22 12 0.005 0.007
BubbleSort 528 15 14 0.0005 0.0003
HeapSort 858 72 32 0.053 0.025
QuickSort 833 87 44 0.54 0.25
Figure 8: Class files in bytes, certificates in number of constraints, time in
seconds
The two checking times in the last column give the checking time with and
without fixpoint pruning Three things are worth noticing. First, invariants
that had to be produced manually for the Xanadu examples are now inferred
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automatically. Second, the checking time is small, especially given that the
checker is extracted from its Coq specification and thus is a purely functional
implementation of a polyhedral domain. Third, pruning can halve the number
of constraints to verify. This reduction can sometimes but not always produce
a similar reduction in checking time. The benchmarks are relatively modest in
size and it is well known that full-blown polyhedral analyses have scalability
problems. Our analyser will not avoid this but can be instantiated with simpler
relational domains such as e.g., octagons, without having to change the checker.
10 Related work
A number of relational abstract domains (octagons [18], convex polyhedra [13],
polynomial equalities [20]) have been proposed with various trade-offs between
precision and efficiency, and intra-procedural relational abstract interpretation
for high-level imperative languages is by now a mature analysis technique. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge the present work is the first extension of this
to an inter-procedural analysis for byte code. Dependent type systems for Java-
style byte code for removing array bounds checks have been proposed by Xi
and Xia [28]. The analysis of the stack uses singleton types to track the values
of stack elements, achieving the same as our symbolic stack expressions. The
analysis is intra-procedural and does not consider methods (they are added in
a later work [27] which also adds a richer set of types). The type checking relies
on loop invariants. We have run our analysis on the example Xanadu programs
given by Xi and have been able to infer the invariants necessary for verifying
safe array access automatically.
The area of certified program verifiers has been an active field recently.
Wildmoser, Nipkow et al. [25] were the first to develop a fully certified VCGen
within Isabelle/HOL for verifying arithmetic overflow in Java byte code. The
certification of abstract interpreters has been developed by Cachera, Pichardie
et al. [9, 21]. for a variety of analyses including class analysis of Java byte
code and interval analysis. Lee et al. [16] have certified the type analysis of a
language close to Standard ML in LF and Leroy [17] has certified some of the
data flow analyses of a compiler back-end. Leroy also observes that for certain,
more involved analyses such as the register allocation, it is simpler and sufficient
to certify a checker of the result than the analysis itself. The same idea is used by
Wildmoser et al. [24] who certifies a VCGen that uses untrusted interval analysis
for producing invariants and that relies on Isabelle/HOL decision procedures to
check the verification conditions generated with the help of these invariants.
Their technique for analysing byte code is close to ours in that they also use
symbolic expressions to analyse the operand stack and the main contribution of
the work reported here with respect to theirs is to develop this result checking
approach for a fully relational analysis.
The idea of removing useless parts from an invariant was developed inde-
pendently by Besson et al. [7] and by Yang et al. [29] who call it abstract value
slicing. Both works deal with intra-procedural invariants and both are based on
a dependency computation that selects, for every constraint F (X) v Y of the
constraint system of P and every subset of an abstract state Y , a sufficient subset
of X that satisfies the constraint. The two methods differ in the way that this
choice is done but both have been shown viable for intra-procedural pruning of
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relational invariants. The present work is an extension of the principles under-
lying the non-deterministic algorithm in [7] to handle the pre-/post-conditions
arising from the interprocedural analysis. Finally, it should be noted that the
fixpoint compression is orthogonal to and compatible with the optimisation of
iteration strategies for fixpoint checking underlying Lightweight Bytecode Veri-
fication [22] and the more general abstraction-carrying code [1, 6]. Our checker
combines both techniques.
11 Conclusions and future work
This paper demonstrates the feasibility of an interprocedural relational analysis
which automatically infers polyhedral loop invariants and pre-/post-condition
for programs in an imperative byte code language. The machine-generated in-
variants can be pruned wrt. a particular safety policy to yield compact program
certificates. To simplify the checking of these certificates, we have devised a re-
sult checker for polyhedra which uses inclusion certificates (issued from a result
due to Farkas) instead of computing convex hulls of polyhedra at join points.
This checker is much simpler to prove correct mechanically than the polyhedral
analyser and provides a means of building a foundational proof carrying code
that can make use of industrial strength relational program analysis.
Future work concerns extensions to incorporate richer domains of proper-
ties such as disjunctive completion of polyhedra or non-linear (polynomial) in-
variants. The certificate format and the result checker can accommodate the
disjunctive completions, the inclusion certificates from Section 8.2 can be gener-
alised to deal with non-linear inequalities as well [5]. However, the analyses for
inferring such properties are in their infancy. On a language level, the challenge
is to extend the analysis to cover the object oriented aspects of Java byte code.
The inclusion of static fields and arrays in our framework provides a first step in
that direction but a full extension would notably require an additional analysis
to keep track of aliases between objects.
A promising domain of application for our relational analysis technique is
to verify the dynamic allocation and consumption of resources and in particu-
lar to ensure statically that a program always acquires a necessary amount of
resources before consuming them. The approach of Chander et al. [10] relies
on the programmer to provide loop invariants and pre- and post-conditions for
methods in order to link program variables to the amount of resources available
and perform powerful transformations such as hoisting resource allocations out
of loops. Our inter-procedural byte code analyser could infer the necessary in-
variants and pre-/post-conditions and in the same vein provide the checker for
integrating this into a mobile code resource certification scheme.
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[18] A. Miné. The octagon abstract domain. In Proc. of Working Conf. on
Reverse Engineering 2001, IEEE, pages 310–319. IEEE CS Press, October
2001.
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